



## When Mediation Becomes a Target: Sovereignty Norms, Extraterritorial Force, and the Doha 2025 Strike

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### Abstract:

This article analyzes the regional and geopolitical repercussions of Israel's September 9, 2025 strike in Doha, Qatar, arguing that the episode marked a qualitative shift in regional conflict management: mediation venues and negotiators became targetable. Employing a qualitative case-study design with process tracing and discourse analysis, the study draws on official statements, United Nations materials, and regional diplomatic messaging to examine how the incident reshaped sovereignty contestation, deterrence signaling, alliance credibility, and Gulf security coordination. The theoretical framework integrates sovereignty and use-of-force debates with deterrence and signaling, alliance politics, and mediation theory, introducing the concept of the "mediator's sanctuary" to capture expectations of protected negotiation space. Findings indicate a threefold shock: a legitimacy crisis around territorial integrity and accountability; an alliance-credibility stress test that amplified hedging and defense diversification pressures across GCC states; and an institutional shock to mediation integrity that reduced confidence in ceasefire diplomacy and increased risks of bargaining breakdown and escalation. The article concludes with policy implications for safeguarding mediation processes, strengthening GCC crisis coordination, and clarifying prohibitions against targeting negotiators and host territory.

**Keywords:** *mediation targeting; sovereignty norms; extraterritorial force; Gulf security; alliance credibility; deterrence signaling; negotiation integrity.*

### INTRODUCTION

In September 2025, Doha—long portrayed as a pivotal diplomatic venue in Middle East crisis management—became the site of a highly consequential cross-border strike. In public debate, the event was framed as a qualitative shift: a move from targeting militant infrastructures in recognized battle spaces to striking on the sovereign territory of a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state whose international profile is closely tied to mediation and negotiation. Because the incident unfolded against the backdrop of intense diplomacy aimed at achieving a Gaza ceasefire and securing a hostage-exchange arrangement, the location

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itself amplified the political meaning of the strike. A Gulf capital associated with negotiation processes appeared, suddenly, as a militarized space.

The Doha incident matters for three interrelated reasons. First, it foregrounds the continuing political force of sovereignty norms. Even in regions where territorial violations occur, sovereignty remains the dominant vocabulary through which states assign legitimacy, define red lines, and impose reputational costs (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). The prohibition on the use of force is not only a legal rule but also a political institution that structures expectations about acceptable behavior and helps stabilize interstate relations. As scholarship on norms and legitimacy has shown, violations can paradoxically intensify norm invocation because they force actors to articulate boundaries and mobilize condemnation (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Hurd, 2007).

Second, the incident tests alliance credibility in a region whose security architecture has been deeply shaped by external patrons and military basing (Gresh, 2015). Qatar's hosting of major foreign military facilities is often interpreted by regional elites as a form of insurance: a deterrent that raises the expected costs of attacks on its territory and increases the probability of patron support in crises. When a strike occurs despite such infrastructure, a credibility debate emerges about deterrence effectiveness, the willingness of patrons to protect partners, and the degree to which basing translates into security guarantees rather than exposure. These debates are not merely rhetorical; they can catalyze hedging behavior, diversification of security partnerships, and the renegotiation of alignment strategies (Snyder, 1984; Leeds, 2003).

Third—and most distinctively—the Doha strike intersects with the institutional infrastructure of mediation. Qatar has been analyzed as a small state that converts vulnerability into influence through active diplomacy and brokerage (Cooper & Momani, 2011; Kamrava, 2011; Kamrava, 2013). Mediation, however, depends on more than access and leverage. It depends on credible assurances that negotiation spaces are sufficiently safe for parties to convene, communicate, and bargain (Bercovitch, 2000; Beardsley, 2011). If those assurances are undermined, the costs of bargaining increase. Negotiators may avoid travel, intermediaries may hesitate to host, and patrons may pressure mediators to restrict engagement. In such circumstances, mediation becomes vulnerable not only to political contestation but to physical disruption.

This paper argues that the Doha incident should be conceptualized as a critical juncture producing a triadic shock across (1) sovereignty norms, (2) alliance credibility, and (3) mediation integrity. The triadic lens clarifies why reactions were wide-ranging, why rhetorical unity could coexist with material constraint, and why the incident resonated beyond the immediate Gaza-related battlefield into debates about Gulf security order. The argument does not require that all actors interpret the strike identically. It requires only that key regional and international actors perceive the incident as normatively and strategically consequential and that these perceptions shape subsequent signaling and adaptation.



The research problem addressed here emerges at the intersection of literatures that are often discussed separately. Gulf security scholarship has examined external basing, deterrence, and regime security (Gause, 2010; Gresh, 2015), while mediation scholarship has explored how intermediaries reduce uncertainty and shape incentives (Bercovitch, 2000; Kydd, 2003; Beardsley, 2011). Small-state scholarship further shows that niche strategies—such as hosting, brokerage, and institution building—can produce influence disproportionate to material size (Keohane, 1969; Ingebritsen et al., 2006). Yet less attention has been devoted to moments when these logics collide: when a mediator’s territory becomes a site of coercion and when mediation roles become security vulnerabilities.

The study therefore asks how an incident of this kind reshapes (a) regional security behavior and alliance expectations and (b) the institutional viability of mediation as a pathway out of protracted conflict. The paper’s purpose is not to adjudicate operational details that may remain contested in the public record. Instead, it offers a theoretically grounded account of early signals and mechanisms: how actors framed the incident, what strategic anxieties it generated, and how these anxieties plausibly translate into hedging, institutional recalibration, or escalation management.

The paper proceeds in eight parts. The literature review synthesizes scholarship on sovereignty and the use of force, deterrence and signaling, alliance politics and Gulf security architecture, and mediation and small-state diplomacy. It then proposes the concept of the mediator’s sanctuary and the triadic vulnerability framework. Subsequent sections state research objectives, the research problem, limitations, and contributions, and list the research questions. The methodology outlines a qualitative case-study design and an analytic strategy combining process tracing and discourse analysis (George & Bennett, 2005). The analysis section examines the incident’s regional and geopolitical ramifications through the triadic lens, focusing on GCC dynamics, Egypt’s and Turkey’s signaling, the role of international institutions, the implications for U.S. credibility and Gulf security strategy, and the consequences for the Palestinian track and negotiation processes. The conclusion summarizes findings and offers policy recommendations for protecting mediation venues and reducing escalation risk.

## **1. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework**

### **2.1 Sovereignty, territorial integrity, and extraterritorial force**

Sovereignty and territorial integrity remain foundational principles in the contemporary international order. Scholars of international norms emphasize that even when norms are violated, they can remain politically powerful because actors continue to invoke them as standards of legitimacy and as tools for assigning reputational costs (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). This is particularly true for the prohibition on the

use of force. The UN Charter regime places strong constraints on interstate violence: force is prohibited except under limited conditions, most prominently Security Council authorization or lawful self-defense. Yet interpretation is contested. States often justify cross-border strikes through expansive claims of self-defense, pre-emption, or necessity, producing a persistent tension between legal restraint and strategic practice (Gray, 2018; Ruys, 2010).

From an analytical perspective, the question is not simply whether a strike is legal, but how legality claims interact with legitimacy and escalation. The literature shows that legal arguments can be instrumental—used to frame actions as legitimate and to reduce diplomatic costs. Conversely, contested legality can intensify polarization and mobilize counter-coalitions. The Security Council’s language choices and attribution politics are therefore more than rhetorical; they shape the normative environment in which future actions are judged (Hurd, 2007).

Targeted killing scholarship further clarifies why extraterritorial operations can be normatively and strategically destabilizing. Melzer (2008) argues that targeted killings raise acute legal and ethical concerns, particularly where they blur the line between armed conflict and law-enforcement paradigms. Even where “precision” is claimed, the practice can erode incentives for capture, trial, and negotiated settlement. When targets are political actors or negotiators, the risk is not only legal controversy but institutional degradation: the conditions for diplomacy are weakened when bargaining becomes physically dangerous. Thus, the use-of-force literature and targeted-killing literature together suggest that the normative stakes of an extraterritorial strike are highest when the strike occurs in third-party territory and intersects with negotiation processes.

## **2.2 Deterrence, signaling, and escalation dynamics**

Deterrence theory provides a second body of scholarship relevant to the Doha incident. Schelling (1966) famously emphasized that coercion is communicative: threats and limited uses of force are intended to shape the adversary’s expectations and risk calculations. The logic is not only to impose costs but to manipulate uncertainty and signal resolve. In crisis bargaining, the challenge is credible signaling under uncertainty. States seek to persuade others of their willingness to pay costs, but bluffing is always possible.

Fearon’s (1994) audience-costs model clarifies one way in which credibility can be generated: leaders who make public commitments risk domestic punishment if they retreat, making their signals more credible. Yet the same mechanism can increase escalation risk. If leaders tie their hands publicly, de-escalation becomes costlier and misperceptions can spiral. Jervis’s (1978) security dilemma framework adds another layer: actions taken for defense can be interpreted as offensive by others, increasing mutual fear. In a crowded security environment like the Middle East, where multiple conflicts overlap and narratives are polarized,



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signaling problems are acute. An extraterritorial strike can be interpreted simultaneously as deterrence, provocation, punishment, or escalation.

In the Doha case, deterrence and signaling operate in at least two directions. First, the strike signals to the targeted organization that geographic distance and diplomatic venues do not guarantee immunity. Second, it signals to host states and their patrons that security guarantees may not prevent sovereignty violations. Such signaling can produce adaptation: host states may tighten security protocols, patrons may reassess rules of engagement, and regional actors may update their beliefs about the permissibility of cross-border action. In deterrence terms, the strike can be seen as a form of “compellence” aimed at shaping behavior, but it can also generate counter-signals—public condemnation, red lines, and alliance hedging—if others interpret it as a threatening precedent.

### **2.3 Alliance politics, security dependency, and the Gulf security complex**

A third body of scholarship concerns alliance politics and Gulf security architecture. Gulf security has been deeply shaped by asymmetric capabilities and external patronage. Gause (2010) shows that the international relations of the Persian Gulf have been structured by rivalry, regime security concerns, and external intervention. Gresh (2015) argues that foreign basing in the Gulf is closely tied to regime survival: hosting external forces provides deterrence benefits but also embeds states in patron politics and exposes them to reputational and security risks.

Alliance politics scholarship offers a vocabulary for understanding why such arrangements are simultaneously attractive and risky. Snyder (1984) describes the alliance security dilemma: states fear abandonment by allies but also fear entrapment in conflicts caused by allies. This dilemma is especially sharp for smaller states that depend on stronger patrons. Leeds (2003) demonstrates that alliance reliability varies; states sometimes violate commitments due to shifting strategic incentives. Reliability is thus a perception as much as a material reality; dependent partners constantly interpret signals from patrons.

The Gulf can also be read through regional security complex theory. Buzan and Wæver (2003) argue that security interdependence is regionally clustered: threats and alliances are most intense among proximate actors, so events in one part of a region reverberate across the system. The Doha incident is a plausible “regional shock” because it links the Gaza conflict to Gulf territory, activating broader fears of spillover and altering threat perceptions. Importantly, regional complexes are not only about military capabilities; they include political narratives and legitimacy contests. A strike that is widely framed as violating Gulf sovereignty can reconfigure regional alignments even when no immediate military retaliation occurs.

### **2.4 Mediation, credibility, and small-state diplomatic brokerage**

A fourth body of scholarship concerns mediation and the foreign policy strategies of small states. Qatar's diplomacy has been widely analyzed as a form of "entrepreneurial" small-state strategy, converting brokerage and hosting into international influence (Cooper & Momani, 2011; Kamrava, 2011; Kamrava, 2013). Keohane's (1969) classic discussion of "Lilliputians' dilemmas" highlighted that small states face structural constraints but can pursue influence through institutions and niche strategies. Subsequent scholarship on small states emphasizes that they often seek security through international legitimacy, network diplomacy, and role specialization (Ingebritsen et al., 2006).

Mediation scholarship provides a more specific lens. Bercovitch (2000) and Beardsley (2011) show that mediation success depends on context, mediator strategy, and the capacity to reduce uncertainty and alter incentives. Kydd (2003) provides a key mechanism: mediators can transmit credible information, and bias can sometimes enhance effectiveness when it generates access and leverage. Yet mediation depends on more than credibility and bias. It depends on the physical and political conditions of negotiation. Parties must be able to meet, communicate, and bargain without prohibitive risk. This is often assumed rather than theorized. The Doha incident therefore highlights what this paper calls mediation integrity: the credibility of a host's ability to provide a minimally secure space for bargaining. When a strike occurs in the mediator's territory, mediation becomes not only politically contested but physically vulnerable. This can create a bargaining disincentive: parties may avoid travel, mediators may hesitate to host, and patrons may pressure mediators to alter their role. In practical terms, this can prolong conflict by reducing opportunities for negotiated de-escalation.

### **1.5 Theoretical synthesis: the mediator's sanctuary and triadic vulnerability**

To integrate these literatures, this paper proposes the concept of the mediator's sanctuary. The mediator's sanctuary refers to the normative and functional expectation that mediation venues hosted by third parties are treated as protected spaces, sufficiently insulated from direct coercion to allow bargaining. This expectation is sustained by multiple mechanisms: international norms of sovereignty, reputational incentives for restraint, and the strategic interests of patrons that benefit from mediation outcomes. The sanctuary is never absolute. Yet when it is punctured—when a strike occurs in the host territory and is publicly understood as targeting actors connected to negotiation—the implications extend beyond the immediate event.

### **2.6 The sanctuary's breach produces triadic vulnerability across three domains.**

- a. Normative vulnerability (sovereignty shock): the strike triggers intense norm contestation and compels actors to reassert territorial integrity claims, raising reputational and diplomatic costs (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Gray, 2018).



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- b. Strategic vulnerability (alliance credibility shock): the incident tests patron protection and triggers hedging and diversification incentives under the alliance security dilemma (Snyder, 1984; Leeds, 2003).
  - c. Institutional vulnerability (mediation integrity shock): bargaining becomes riskier as the physical security of negotiation venues is questioned, exacerbating information and commitment problems (Kydd, 2003; Beardsley, 2011).

This triadic lens guides the empirical analysis that follows. It treats regional reactions as signals embedded in norms, alliances, and institutional conditions rather than as isolated statements. It also clarifies how a single strike can create ripple effects across seemingly separate domains: sovereignty debates, Gulf security strategy, and mediation viability.

## 2. Research Objectives

The study pursues six objectives:

1. To conceptualize the Doha 2025 incident as a sovereignty- and mediation-relevant security event rather than only an operational episode linked to Gaza.
2. To analyze GCC reactions as signals of unity, constraint, and strategic adaptation under conditions of security dependency.
3. To examine how Egypt and Turkey used public signaling to articulate red lines and manage escalation risks.
4. To interpret UN and Security Council dynamics as part of the politics of norm enforcement, attribution, and legitimacy.
5. To assess how U.S. credibility debates shaped Gulf perceptions of alliance reliability and incentives for hedging and diversification.
6. To develop policy-relevant recommendations aimed at protecting mediation venues and reducing escalation risks in the Gulf regional security complex.

## 3. Research Problem

The research problem addressed in this article is situated at the intersection of two well-developed but rarely integrated research agendas: (1) scholarship on Gulf security dependence and alliance management, and (2) scholarship on mediation and small-state diplomatic brokerage. On the one hand, Gulf security studies have documented how external basing, technological dependence, and patronage relationships structure threat perceptions and constrain policy choices (Gause, 2010; Gresh, 2015). On the other hand, mediation studies have explained how intermediaries reduce uncertainty, transmit credible

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information, and help parties overcome bargaining failures (Bercovitch, 2000; Kydd, 2003; Beardsley, 2011). Small-state scholarship further emphasizes that niche strategies—such as hosting diplomacy and investing in institutional roles—can generate influence disproportionate to material size (Keohane, 1969; Ingebritsen et al., 2006).

The Doha incident exposes a gap in the way these agendas are often treated separately. Gulf security is frequently analyzed as “hard” deterrence and alliance politics, while mediation hosting is treated as “soft” diplomacy. Yet an extraterritorial strike on a mediator’s territory turns diplomacy itself into a security variable: it raises questions about the credibility of external protection, the safety of negotiation spaces, and the reputational costs of continuing to host political interlocutors. The research problem can therefore be stated as follows: How does a sovereignty-violating strike in a mediation hub reshape regional security behavior and negotiation dynamics simultaneously?

Answering this problem requires attention to mechanisms rather than only outcomes. The key mechanisms examined here are (a) sovereignty shock, which mobilizes norm-based condemnation and creates pressure for collective response; (b) alliance-credibility shock, which forces dependent partners to reassess the meaning of protection and encourages hedging; and (c) mediation-integrity shock, which raises the perceived risks of convening talks and intensifies commitment and information problems in bargaining. The Doha incident is used as a critical case to trace how these mechanisms appear in public framing and early strategic adaptation.

#### **4. Limitations**

Four limitations should be acknowledged to clarify the scope of the findings.

First, the study relies on publicly available materials—official statements, UN-related records, and documented public diplomacy. It cannot access classified operational intelligence or closed-door deliberations that would clarify targeting decisions, prior warnings, or private assurances between patrons and partners. Because these details remain outside the public record, the analysis treats them as sources of uncertainty and focuses on how uncertainty shapes signaling and credibility debates and hedging behavior.

Second, the incident is temporally close to the time of writing, meaning that many second-order consequences are still unfolding. Alliance adaptation, procurement decisions, and institutional reforms in the GCC typically occur over years rather than weeks. The paper therefore prioritizes early indicators and plausibly activated mechanisms, not definitive long-term outcomes.

Third, the analysis is interpretive and discourse-focused. It emphasizes framing, signaling, and public justification. Such evidence is well-suited to studying audience costs and norm contestation (Fearon, 1994; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998), but it cannot fully capture the distribution of private preferences or the exact



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balance of material capabilities behind public statements. To mitigate this limitation, the study triangulates across multiple sources and avoids over-attributing causal power to any single statement.

Fourth, generalizability is limited by the uniqueness of the Gulf context. Qatar's mediation role, the density of foreign basing, and the regional salience of the Palestinian issue make the case unusually consequential. The paper does not claim that all mediation hubs will experience the same dynamics. Instead, it uses the Doha case to refine theory by specifying a mechanism—the breach of the mediator's sanctuary—that may be relevant in other contexts where third-party venues are targeted or threatened.

These limitations do not undermine the core contribution. They clarify that the paper's aim is to explain how a sovereignty-violating strike in a mediation hub generates rapid shifts in framing, credibility assessment, and bargaining incentives, and to identify what observable indicators would support competing trajectories over time.

## 5. Contribution

This article contributes to scholarship and policy debates in three main ways.

First, it advances a conceptual bridge between international norms, alliance politics, and mediation theory by proposing the concept of the mediator's sanctuary. Existing work shows that sovereignty norms shape legitimacy claims (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998), that alliance relationships generate security dilemmas and credibility problems (Snyder, 1984; Leeds, 2003), and that mediation can reduce information and commitment problems when credible channels exist (Kydd, 2003; Beardsley, 2011). The mediator's sanctuary concept integrates these insights by highlighting that negotiation venues are not merely diplomatic backdrops but institutional resources that depend on expectations of protection and restraint. When that protection is punctured, the resulting triadic vulnerability can simultaneously destabilize normative legitimacy, alliance credibility, and bargaining conditions.

Second, the article extends Gulf security scholarship by treating mediation hosting as an element of security order rather than as a separate sphere of "soft power." Gulf security studies have emphasized external basing and regime survival (Gause, 2010; Gresh, 2015). Small-state scholarship shows that states with limited capabilities can pursue influence through institutions and niche strategies (Keohane, 1969; Ingebritsen et al., 2006). By placing these literatures in conversation, the paper shows how a brokerage strategy can become a security liability when adversaries seek to deter hosting and when patrons are unwilling or unable to guarantee sanctuary.

Third, the article offers a theoretically disciplined qualitative case study that identifies mechanisms and observable implications. It specifies how sovereignty shock should manifest in institutional language and coalition building, how alliance-credibility shock should manifest in reassurance demands and hedging

behavior, and how mediation-integrity shock should manifest in changes to hosting practices and negotiation willingness. These observable implications can guide future comparative research across other cases where mediation venues were threatened, attacked, or politicized.

## 6. Research Questions

The study addresses three research questions:

1. How did regional actors frame and respond to the Doha strike in terms of sovereignty, deterrence, and mediation legitimacy?
2. What role did alliance credibility and security dependency play in shaping GCC and wider regional reactions?
3. How does targeting negotiators or mediation spaces affect bargaining conditions and prospects for negotiated de-escalation?

## 7. Methodology

This research employs a qualitative case-study design with process tracing, consistent with established approaches to theory development and causal mechanism inference in the social sciences (George & Bennett, 2005). The Doha incident is treated as a “critical case” because it combines an extraterritorial use of force on the territory of a mediator-hub state with direct implications for alliance credibility and for the institutional viability of negotiation processes.

### 8.1 Case selection and logic

The case is selected for its theoretical leverage in three ways. First, it is a sovereignty-sensitive case: a cross-border strike in a third country triggers immediate norm contestation and raises questions about the limits of self-defense and extraterritorial targeting (Gray, 2018; Ruys, 2010). Second, it is alliance-sensitive: the incident occurred in a security environment characterized by dense external basing and long-standing patronage relationships, making credibility assessments especially salient (Gresh, 2015). Third, it is mediation-sensitive: Doha’s diplomatic posture has been repeatedly described as brokerage-oriented, and the incident unfolded during a period in which negotiation and mediation were central to crisis management (Cooper & Momani, 2011; Kamrava, 2011).

### 8.2 Units of analysis and time frame

The primary unit of analysis is elite framing and signaling in the immediate aftermath of the strike. The study focuses on how key actors—Qatar, GCC member states, Egypt, Turkey, the United States, and relevant UN officials—publicly described the event, what norms and interests they invoked, and what



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implied or explicit red lines they articulated. The temporal scope is the short “reaction window” following the incident (days to weeks), because the research aim is to capture early mechanisms of strategic adaptation and credibility updating. Longer-term consequences are treated as hypotheses and scenarios rather than as empirically settled outcomes.

### 8.3 Data sources

1. The empirical material is drawn from three categories of sources:  
Primary diplomatic and institutional materials, including publicly available UN-related statements and records, and official communications by relevant states. These sources are used to reconstruct publicly uncontested facts (e.g., condemnation language, calls for investigation, demands for restraint) and to identify how sovereignty and legality were framed.
2. Public diplomacy and elite signaling, including speeches, press briefings, and official releases (including official social-media accounts where relevant). These sources are used to trace audience-cost dynamics and escalation management, since public commitments can alter the costs of backing down (Fearon, 1994).
3. Peer-reviewed scholarly literature that provides theoretical context for interpreting sovereignty norms, deterrence signaling, alliance politics, Gulf security architecture, and mediation dynamics (see References). Scholarly sources are not used to establish the chronology of a 2025 event; rather, they discipline the interpretation of mechanisms and help specify what would count as evidence for particular causal pathways.

### 8.4 Coding and analytic strategy

#### 8.4.1 The analysis proceeds in three steps.

First, it reconstructs the incident and immediate reactions using primary materials and documented public records. Second, it maps discursive frames across actors by coding for recurring themes that follow directly from the theoretical framework: (a) sovereignty violation and legality language; (b) deterrence, retaliation, and escalation warnings; (c) alliance credibility, protection, and reassurance; and (d) mediation integrity, negotiation safety, and the protection of political interlocutors. Third, it interprets these frames through the lens of the mediator’s sanctuary and triadic vulnerability to infer plausible mechanisms linking the strike to strategic adaptation.

#### **8.4.2 Handling contested facts**

Because details of covert operations and intelligence are rarely verifiable in real time, the analysis uses cautious language where necessary (e.g., “reported,” “publicly alleged,” “widely discussed”). The objective is not to adjudicate operational details, but to analyze how perceptions, frames, and credibility debates emerged and how these debates can shape behavior under uncertainty. This choice reflects a core insight in deterrence and alliance scholarship: beliefs and expectations can influence strategic interaction even when the underlying facts are contested (Schelling, 1966; Snyder, 1984).

#### **8.4.3 Validity, triangulation, and research ethics**

To enhance validity, the study triangulates across multiple types of public records (institutional statements, national statements, and public diplomacy). It also uses theory as a constraint: interpretations are limited to mechanisms established in peer-reviewed scholarship and do not rely on unverifiable conjecture. Finally, the study does not use private data and does not identify non-public individuals; it relies solely on publicly available materials, minimizing ethical risks associated with sensitive conflict contexts.

### **8. Analysis**

#### **9.1 Sovereignty shock and the politics of attribution in international institutions**

The first major effect of the Doha incident was to transform what might otherwise be treated as an operational event into a sovereignty dispute. In sovereignty disputes, attribution is political. Even where many actors believe they know the perpetrator, institutional statements may avoid explicit naming to preserve consensus, reduce escalation, or manage alliance sensitivities. This dynamic is familiar in Security Council politics: legitimacy and effectiveness often depend on carefully calibrated language that condemns the act in norm-laden terms while still preserving diplomatic space for consensus building and escalation management

From a norms perspective, the critical point is that sovereignty became the shared vocabulary through which regional and international actors signaled condemnation. This reflects the continued institutional force of sovereignty norms even in conflict-prone regions (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). By invoking territorial integrity, states position the strike as a precedent that threatens more than one capital, raising the political cost of repetition. Such framing is also rational in a regional security complex: it widens the “audience of states and publics who now perceive themselves as exposed to comparable sovereignty violations, especially when mediation venues are treated as militarized spaces

The politics of attribution intersects with the law-of-force literature. Gray (2018) and Ruys (2010) show that states often navigate contested legality through institutional ambiguity. They may condemn “violations of



sovereignty” while avoiding explicit legal conclusions about aggression or self-defense, particularly when alliance politics shape drafting. In this setting, condemnation can be simultaneously meaningful and limited: meaningful because it restates the norm boundary; limited because it may not identify an enforcer or impose sanctions. The Doha incident therefore illustrates a recurring pattern in norm-based orders: institutions may signal disapproval while remaining constrained on enforcement, especially when powerful members disagree.

A further layer concerns the targeting of political interlocutors. Targeted killing scholarship warns that when lethal operations extend to political actors associated with negotiation, the legal and ethical controversy is compounded (Melzer, 2008). Even when an actor claims necessity, the act can be perceived as sabotaging diplomacy. In the Doha case, the strike was widely framed as not only a territorial violation but an assault on the negotiation process itself, making the sovereignty shock inseparable from a mediation shock. This linkage is central to the theoretical claim of this paper: the breach of a mediator’s sanctuary collapses the boundary between diplomatic space and battlefield space.

## 9.2 GCC reactions: unity as signal, constraint as structure

Public reactions by GCC governments were widely described as unusually unified. Statements emphasized that the strike violated Qatari sovereignty and that the security of GCC states is interconnected. In signaling terms, such rhetorical unity performs several functions. It reassures domestic audiences that leaders will not treat the incident as “normal.” It signals to external actors that repetition will carry region-wide political costs. It also communicates intra-GCC cohesion, an important point given the GCC’s recent history of internal crisis and fragmentation. In other words, unity is not only a diplomatic posture; it is an institutional signal about the bloc’s capacity to act collectively.

At the same time, rhetorical unity coexisted with practical constraint. Gulf militaries have substantial budgets, yet their collective defense capacity remains limited by integration challenges, political divergence, and continuing reliance on external partners for advanced systems. This creates a classic alliance security dilemma. If GCC states escalate directly, they risk entrapment in a wider war under conditions of capability asymmetry. If they do not, they risk appearing acquiescent, which can weaken deterrence and invite further violations. Snyder (1984) captures this dilemma: alliance management is a constant balancing act between avoiding abandonment and avoiding entrapment. The Doha incident made this dilemma visible by compressing it into an acute sovereignty crisis.

The likely strategic response is therefore multi-layered. On one layer, GCC states pursue coalition diplomacy—emergency consultations, joint communiqués, and calls for international investigation—because these actions impose reputational and political costs at low immediate military risk. On another

layer, they seek reassurance from patrons and explore defensive adaptation, especially in air and missile defense and intelligence fusion. On a third layer, they quietly adjust hedging strategies by diversifying partnerships and reducing single-patron dependence. In each layer, the objective is to reduce vulnerability without triggering immediate war.

This pattern is consistent with Schelling's (1966) emphasis that coercion is not limited to battlefield force. Economic and reputational costs can also shape behavior when military options are unattractive. In Gulf debates, this logic can take multiple forms: leveraging diplomatic relationships with major powers, coordinating within international organizations, and potentially using investment and energy networks as instruments of influence. Yet such measures are also constrained by interdependence: Gulf economies benefit from stability and from global connectivity, and leaders must balance coercive ambitions with economic risk.

The Doha incident also revived debate about GCC collective defense frameworks. The GCC has long discussed mechanisms for collective security, but crises repeatedly reveal the gap between treaty rhetoric and operational readiness. That gap matters analytically because credibility is partly institutional. Alliance reliability is not only a matter of intent; it is also about whether institutional arrangements enable rapid joint action (Leeds, 2003). Where institutional capacity is weak, even unified rhetoric may not deter future violations. Consequently, one plausible longer-term effect of the incident is increased emphasis on crisis coordination, information sharing, and rapid diplomatic response mechanisms—forms of “collective resilience” that do not require full military integration but can still improve credibility.

### **9.3 Qatar's small-state strategy and reputational security**

Qatar's position in this crisis illustrates a central theme in small-state scholarship: vulnerability can be converted into influence, but the conversion depends on a stable environment and credible protections (Keohane, 1969; Ingebritsen et al., 2006). Qatar has pursued a strategy of active diplomacy, hosting, and brokerage that expands its international profile beyond what its material capabilities alone would predict (Cooper & Momani, 2011; Kamrava, 2011). This strategy is often described as “niche diplomacy” or “entrepreneurial diplomacy,” and it relies on the ability to maintain communication channels across rival blocs.

The strike posed a reputational challenge precisely because it threatened the premise of that strategy. If a mediation hub is perceived as unsafe, the value of hosting declines. The host state may also face pressure from multiple sides: from targets and their supporters who demand protection, from adversaries who seek to deter the hosting of certain actors, and from patrons who wish to manage escalation. This three-sided



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pressure is a form of reputational security dilemma. The host must demonstrate sovereignty defense without closing diplomatic channels; it must maintain the credibility of its mediation role without appearing to provide impunity to actors designated as threats by others.

From the perspective of the mediator's sanctuary framework, Qatar's core challenge is institutional: restoring confidence that Doha can function as a venue for negotiation. This is not only a matter of physical security measures. It is also a matter of political credibility: can the host credibly assure parties that their presence will not be exploited to target them, and can it reassure external powers that mediation will not become a cover for operational planning? These are difficult trade-offs, and they highlight why mediation is inseparable from security politics in the Gulf.

#### 9.4 Egypt's signaling: sovereignty red lines under constraint

Egypt's reaction carried distinct weight because Cairo occupies a unique regional position. It maintains a formal peace treaty with Israel while also acting as a central mediator in Palestinian affairs and a security stakeholder in Gaza. Public Egyptian messaging following the Doha incident emphasized sovereignty red lines and warned against the normalization of extraterritorial operations in Arab capitals. In deterrence terms, this is an attempt to establish a credible boundary: if such operations occur on Egyptian territory, Egypt would respond as if facing a direct attack on sovereignty.

Fearon's (1994) audience-costs logic helps explain why such rhetoric matters. Public warnings create domestic and regional audiences that can punish inconsistency, thereby increasing the credibility of the signal. Yet credibility also carries risk: strong language can reduce room for maneuver and increase escalation if a red line is tested. Egypt's posture therefore reflects controlled deterrence. It seeks to communicate boundaries and to mobilize regional opinion while avoiding immediate steps that would lock Cairo into interstate conflict, especially given economic pressures and Egypt's interest in maintaining a mediating role.

Egypt's signaling also targets patrons. In complex regional crises, red lines are often communicated not only to the apparent perpetrator but to external actors believed to have leverage. If Arab and Gulf elites perceive that patrons can restrain allies but choose not to, pressure shifts toward the patron. Thus, Egyptian warnings can be interpreted as indirect leverage aimed at deterring future operations through patron restraint. This mechanism is consistent with alliance politics scholarship: when direct confrontation is costly, states seek to influence the behavior of stronger actors through diplomacy, coalition building, and reputational pressure.

Egypt's position also illustrates how mediation roles can be affected by credibility shocks. Egypt's legitimacy as a mediator depends on access, experience, and relationships with multiple parties. If escalation undermines negotiation processes, Egypt's diplomatic leverage can decline. Conversely, if Egypt is perceived as central to de-escalation, its leverage can increase. The Doha incident therefore contributed to a broader

competition over who can credibly manage ceasefire diplomacy, with mediation hubs and mediating states becoming more visible—and thus more vulnerable.

### **9.5 Turkey and the potential for entanglement**

Turkey's response was framed in sharply legal and moral language, emphasizing sovereignty and warning of regional destabilization. From a regional security complex perspective, Turkey's involvement matters because it adds potential entanglement pathways (Buzan & Wæver, 2003). While NATO membership does not mechanically imply escalation, it shapes threat perceptions and diplomatic calculations. External observers may interpret Turkish-Qatari alignment as raising the stakes of an attack on Qatar, and Turkish leaders may interpret the event as part of a broader trend toward permissive extraterritorial targeting.

Turkey's strategic partnership with Qatar provides additional context. Over the past decade, Turkey and Qatar have developed close political and economic ties, and cooperation has included visible security dimensions. In alliance politics terms, this raises a familiar problem: solidarity must be demonstrated without entrapment. Turkey may wish to show that partner territory should not be violated, yet it may also wish to avoid being drawn into a wider conflict. The resulting behavior is likely to combine strong rhetorical condemnation with calibrated steps such as high-level consultations, defensive coordination, and appeals to international norms.

The entanglement risk can be analyzed through Christensen and Snyder's (1990) insight about "chain gangs" and "passed bucks" in multipolar settings. In complex regions, crises can either pull allies into unwanted escalation (chain-gang dynamics) or encourage buck-passing where actors avoid taking responsibility and hope others will manage the crisis. The Doha incident created conditions for both dynamics. The normative shock encouraged solidarity rhetoric, but capability constraints and uncertainty encouraged restraint. Whether chain-gang escalation occurs depends on subsequent triggering events, credibility commitments, and domestic audience pressures.

### **9.6 Wider regional reactions and the politics of alignment**

Beyond the immediate GCC-Egypt-Turkey triangle, the Doha incident stimulated reactions across the wider region. Iran framed the strike as evidence of unchecked aggression and as justification for stronger regional coordination against sovereignty violations. This framing advances Iran's strategic narrative, but it also illustrates how cross-border actions can generate temporary rhetorical convergence among rivals. In regional politics, moments of shared outrage can bridge divides even if deeper strategic competition persists.



For Arab states that maintain formal ties with Israel, the incident increased domestic pressures to demonstrate distance from escalation. When extraterritorial strikes blur the boundary between war zones and diplomatic spaces, publics may interpret normalization as complicity or weakness. This domestic-political dimension matters for alignment because it constrains leaders' room to maneuver. Even if states avoid abrupt policy reversals, the reputational environment changes: publicly visible cooperation becomes costlier, and leaders may adopt more critical public postures to maintain legitimacy.

Internationally, the incident also intersected with debates about the protection of diplomacy. If negotiators and political interlocutors are viewed as legitimate targets even while engaged in talks, then the incentive structure of bargaining shifts. Parties may become less willing to participate in negotiations, and mediators may find it harder to convene talks. This concern is not purely moral; it is strategic. Mediation theory highlights that bargaining requires channels for credible information and commitments (Kydd, 2003; Beardsley, 2011). By increasing fear and uncertainty, strikes on negotiation-adjacent actors can harden positions and prolong conflict.

### **9.7 The United States: credibility shocks and hedging incentives**

The most geopolitically consequential debate following the Doha incident concerned the role of the United States. Qatar hosts major U.S. military infrastructure, and Gulf security architecture has long relied on the perception that basing and partnership provide protection (Gresh, 2015). When a strike occurs under such conditions, perceptions of credibility and deterrence are challenged. Alliance reliability scholarship suggests that partners evaluate patrons not only by formal assurances but by behavior in crises (Leeds, 2003). The relevant question becomes: did the patron anticipate the action, attempt to prevent it, and respond in ways that restore confidence?

In response to credibility uncertainty, the likely strategic consequence is not immediate rupture but intensified hedging. States may diversify arms suppliers, expand partnerships with multiple powers, and invest in autonomous capabilities while remaining embedded in the patron's systems due to interoperability and technological dependence. This is a rational response to the alliance security dilemma: hedging reduces abandonment risk without triggering the costs of full decoupling (Snyder, 1984). The Doha incident can therefore be interpreted as a catalyst that accelerates existing diversification trends in Gulf security strategy.

Credibility debates also shape the behavior of the patron's closest allies. If a patron signals displeasure, it can impose political constraints; if it appears permissive, it can encourage risk-taking. Thus, alliance politics operate in multiple directions: dependent partners evaluate patrons, patrons manage partners, and third parties assess the permissibility of escalation. The Doha incident illustrates how a single event can force multiple actors to update beliefs about the regional "rules of the game."

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### 9.8 Mediation vulnerability and the Palestinian track

The most distinctive analytical implication of the Doha incident lies in its impact on mediation. Qatar's role as a mediator and host of negotiation processes has been widely recognized in scholarship on small-state diplomacy (Cooper & Momani, 2011; Kamrava, 2011). Yet mediation depends on credible process conditions. Kydd (2003) emphasizes that mediators help by reducing information problems and transmitting credible signals. Beardsley (2011) further shows that mediation effectiveness depends on context and on whether the mediator can sustain a process without being undermined by spoilers.

A strike on host territory raises both information and commitment problems. Parties may no longer trust that a venue is safe or that guarantees will be honored. Negotiators may avoid travel; intermediaries may hesitate to host; and external patrons may pressure the mediator to curtail engagement. In practical terms, such dynamics can prolong conflict by reducing opportunities for credible communication. The Doha incident therefore illustrates mediation vulnerability: the possibility that mediation hubs become targetable nodes in the conflict environment.

This vulnerability has a second-order effect on regional politics. If mediation becomes riskier, states may become more cautious about hosting, and conflicts may become harder to de-escalate. At the same time, the incident can increase the perceived importance of mediation protection norms. Norm dynamics scholarship suggests that dramatic violations can sometimes strengthen the salience of a norm by mobilizing condemnation and institutional entrepreneurship (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). In this sense, the Doha incident might catalyze efforts to clarify that targeting negotiation spaces is politically and normatively unacceptable.

### 9.9 Scenarios: escalation, realignment, and institutional adaptation

The post-Doha trajectory can be conceptualized through three scenarios. These scenarios are not predictions; they are analytically disciplined possibilities derived from the triadic vulnerability framework.

Scenario A is an escalatory spiral. If extraterritorial strikes expand and if actors respond with public red lines, audience costs can lock in confrontational postures and increase the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1994). Under this scenario, the region moves toward chain-gang dynamics in which alliance relationships and security partnerships pull actors into escalation (Christensen & Snyder, 1990). A key indicator would be repeated strikes on third-country territory followed by publicly stated retaliation commitments that limit diplomatic flexibility.

Scenario B is managed containment with accelerated hedging. Here, states avoid direct war but adapt strategically—diversifying partnerships, investing in defensive capabilities, and strengthening regional crisis coordination. This scenario aligns with the alliance security dilemma: states hedge against abandonment while avoiding entrapment (Snyder, 1984). Indicators include increased regional consultations, new defense



procurement patterns, expanded intelligence coordination, and quiet diplomacy aimed at re-establishing deterrence through denial rather than through retaliation.

Scenario C is institutional adaptation: the strengthening of norms and mechanisms that protect mediation venues and negotiators. Norm entrepreneurship and institutional framing can increase reputational costs and clarify expectations even when enforcement is imperfect (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Hurd, 2007). This would involve explicit commitments by regional and global actors that targeting mediation spaces is unacceptable, alongside practical measures such as enhanced security protocols for negotiation delegations and international co-guarantees for mediation venues. Indicators would include new UN language, regional declarations, and practical institutionalization of “safe channels” for talks.

These scenarios are not mutually exclusive. Elements of hedging may occur alongside limited escalation risks, and norm-reinforcement efforts may develop in parallel. The analytical value of the triadic vulnerability framework is that it clarifies which mechanisms dominate in each scenario: sovereignty contestation, alliance credibility recalibration, and mediation integrity erosion or reinforcement.

## 9. Conclusion

This article argued that the September 2025 Doha incident should be conceptualized as more than an episodic extension of the Gaza war. Its broader significance lies in the fact that it punctured the expectation that a mediator’s territory is a protected space, thereby producing a triadic shock across norms, alliances, and institutions of diplomacy.

The first substantive finding is normative. The dominant regional vocabulary of reaction was sovereignty: territorial integrity, the prohibition of the use of force, and the demand that mediator-hub states should not be treated as battle spaces. Even where the international system routinely witnesses violations, norm dynamics scholarship shows that violations can intensify a norm’s salience by mobilizing condemnation and institutional framing (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). In this case, sovereignty language served to define the strike as an unacceptable precedent, to mobilize regional solidarity, and to legitimate calls for investigation, restraint, and reaffirmation of territorial integrity

The second finding concerns alliance credibility. The Gulf security order has long relied on dense external basing and patronage relationships (Gresh, 2015). When a high-profile strike occurs in such an environment, it inevitably triggers a credibility debate: what protection does basing actually provide, and how reliable is patron reassurance in moments of crisis? Alliance politics scholarship suggests that partners evaluate patrons by behavior under stress, not by abstract commitments (Leeds, 2003). The likely near-term outcome is intensified hedging and security diversification rather than abrupt strategic rupture, because dependence and interoperability make complete decoupling costly

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The third finding is institutional and relates to mediation integrity. Mediation theory emphasizes that bargaining requires channels for credible communication, reduced uncertainty, and a minimal expectation that the process will not be physically sabotaged (Kydd, 2003; Beardsley, 2011). A strike on the host territory of a mediator increases both information and commitment problems: parties cannot easily distinguish negotiation from targeting, and they cannot trust that participation will be safe. This is the core of mediation vulnerability, and it is what makes the Doha incident a particularly consequential case for theory.

These findings speak directly to the research questions. Regional actors framed the incident through sovereignty and escalation management, while also signaling concerns about mediation safety and alliance protection. Alliance credibility and security dependence shaped the balance between strong rhetorical condemnation and cautious material responses. Finally, the targeting of mediation space undermined bargaining conditions by raising the perceived costs of convening and by increasing incentives for hard-line strategies that rely on lethal enforcement rather than negotiated settlement.

Policy recommendations follow from this analysis. First, regional and international actors should institutionalize protections for mediation venues and political interlocutors. While no legal instrument can eliminate risk, explicit commitments—through UN mechanisms, regional organizations, and bilateral understandings—raise reputational costs and clarify that negotiation spaces are not legitimate targets. Second, the GCC should develop a standing crisis-coordination protocol for sovereignty violations. Such a protocol should include rapid consultation procedures, joint public messaging, agreed diplomatic steps, and mechanisms for escalation control, thereby reducing the risk that uncertainty produces miscalculation. Third, GCC states should prioritize deterrence by denial through improved air and missile defense coordination, intelligence sharing, and protection of critical infrastructure, while also avoiding automatic entanglement in conflicts not of their choosing—an explicit management of the entrapment-abandonment dilemma (Snyder, 1984). Fourth, patrons and partners should clarify crisis-consultation expectations in advance; ambiguity about response thresholds fuels both insecurity and overreaction.

More broadly, the Doha incident demonstrates that conflict expansion can occur not only through geographic spillover but through institutional erosion. When the mediator's sanctuary collapses, diplomacy becomes riskier and war becomes harder to end. Preserving negotiation spaces is therefore not a peripheral diplomatic concern but an integral component of regional security order. Future research should test the mediator's sanctuary concept comparatively across other cases in which negotiation venues were threatened or attacked, and should examine how emerging multipolarity affects the willingness of patrons to protect mediation hubs.



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